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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
road coaches according to their race,15 providing each race is afforded
equal accommodations without discrimination as to comfort, conveni-
ence, or safety. In Berea College v. Kentucky, 6 the Supreme Court
declared that a Kentucky statute permitting equal education to negroes
and whites in the same private corporation but in different localities is
not an abridgment of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Con-
stitution, the court emphasizing the fact that the social and economic
rights of the two races may be equal without being identical, and that such
a segregation is conducive to a promotion of harmonious toleration be-
tween the races. Where appropriate public schools are maintained for
colored children, statutes excluding negroes from public schools estab-
lished for whites are valid, provided equal facilities are afforded the
schools of each race.'7
JOSEPH R. BURCHAM, '28.
OPINION OF ATTORNEY GENERAL*
First, can the General Assembly, by concurrent resolution, providefor the appointment of a committee or commission to investigate the
State Penitentiary to continue its work and make its report to the Gov-
ernor, President Pro Tern of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
after the adjournment of the General Assembl,? As you very well
know, the General Assembly has the right to investigate any state insti-
tution, and it may, by concurrent resolution, appoint a committee for
that purpose, and may authorize such committee to summon witnesses,
administer oaths, and require the production of books and papers, and
this has been done many times since 1875, the date of the adoption of
the present state constitution. In 1879, in 1881 and in 1883 the Gen-
eral Assembly by concurrent resolution, appointed a committee to inquire
into the affairs of the penitentiary, giving the committee authority to
summon witnesses, administer oaths, and require the production of
books and papers. In 1883, the General Assembly, by concurrent reso-
lution, appointed a committee to inquire into the charges against the
State School for the Blind, and it was given the same powers. In 1889,
the General Assembly, by concurrent resolution, appointed a committee
to investigate the management of the State University, and it was given
the same powers. In 1897, the General Assembly, by concurrent resolu-
tion, appointed a committee to investigate the Kansas City Police Force,
and it was given the same powers. In 1899, the General Assembly, by
concurrent resolution, appointed a committee to investigate the munic-
ipal and state governments in St. Louis, and it was given the same
powers. In 1911 the General Assembly, by concurrent resolution, ap-
pointed a committee to investigate the conduct of the State Game and
Fish Warden, and it was given the same powers. In 1913, the Gen-
eral Assembly, by concurrent resolution, appointed a committee to in-
vestigate the State Poultry Board, and it was given the same powers.
Plessey v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 554. "211 U. S. 45.
People v. Gallagher, 93 N. Y. 438.
*An opinion given by North T. Gentry, Attorney General, to the Senate of
Missouri.
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In 1919, the General Assembly, by concurrent resolution appointed a
committee to investigate the State Highway Commission and it was
given the same powers. In every instance, however, the committee did
its work and made its report before the adjournment of the General
Assembly. I have found no instance in the legislative journals of this
State since 1875 where a committee or commission was appointed, by
concurrent resolution, to function after the adjournment of the General
Assembly. On the contrary, in 1879, 1889, 1899, 1909 and 1919, when
the statutes of our state were to be revised, each house of the General
Assembly appointed a committee for that purpose, and the committee,
acting under the authority of a concurrent resolution, continued to func-
tion until the adjournment of the General Assembly. Prior to such ad-journment an act was passed by both houses and approved by the Gov-
ernor, providing for the continuance of such committee and for its com-
pensation after such adjournment. In 1919, Honorables R. S. McClin-
tic, Von Mayes, James W. McKnight, Frank G. Harris, Walter C.
Goodson, A. E. L. Gardner, Conway Elder, and Seth M. Young, mem-
bers of the Senate, and Honorables D. F. Warren, Jones H. Parker,
J. W. Campbell, Walter E. Bailey, S. F. O'Fallon, Frank C. Winken-
son, Frank H. Farris and Nick T. Cave, members of the House, were
members of such committee.
I find no decision of a Missouri court on this subject, but I do find
three cases, one decided by the Supreme Court of Illinois, and one
decided by the Supreme Court of Tennessee, and the other decided by
the Supreme Court of Arkansas, which sustain my position. The Illi-
nois Supreme Court, in discussing the constitutional right of the Legis-
lature to appoint a committee to sit after the final adjournment of the
Legislature and of the authority of the State Treasurer to pay the ex-
penses incurred by such committee, said:
With the sine die adjournment of the legislature, all its func-
tions as a legislative body cease. Its work is ended. It will not
again be called into existence except on the call of the chief execu-
tive for a special purpose, and no presumption will be. indulged that
it will be again so called into being. During the sessions of the
legislature either house may appoint separate committees, and the
two houses acting concurrently, may appoint joint committees for
any proper purpose, which may exercise such powers as the house
or houses appointing them may lawfully delegate or impose. The
only powers which can be conferred upon and delegated to such
committees are such powers as are possessed by the house or
houses making the appointment. As all the powers of the legisla-
ture, as such, cease upon its final adjournment, it must follow that
all the powers which have been delegated by it, or either house
thereof, to a committee by mere resolution cease also.
Fertus v. Russel, 270 II1. I. c. 344-5.
And the Arkansas Supreme Court said:
Under our constitution the legislature has no power, by concur-
rent resolution, to appoint committees or to continue committees
already appointed for the purpose of making investigations after
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the legislature has adjourned.
Dickinson v. Johnson, 176 S. W. Rep. 116.
And the same court, in the same case, further said:
Even if the legislature, by concurrent resolution, could have
continued its committees after final adjournment, it could not, by
resolution under the above provisions of the Constitution, appro-
priate the money necessary for the payment of the expenses of such
committees out of the funds appropriated to pay the contingent
expenses of the legislature. To do this would have required a bill
making the specific appropriation.
And the Tennessee Supreme Court held that a joint resolution of the
legislature, creating a committee to investigate the conduct of the presi-
dent of a normal school, which was to function after the final adjourn-
ment of the legislature, was null and void, and afforded no authority to
the committee attempting to act under it.
And the same rule is enunciated by eminent constitutional text
writers. Cooley "Constitutional Limitations," 7th Ed., p. 193, and
Cushing "Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies," p. 738.
True, the Supreme Courts of some other states, notably Kansas and
West Virginia, hold to the contrary, but I consider the reasoning of the
Illinois, Tennessee and Arkansas courts to be much better, and the word-
ing of the constitutions of some of the other states is different from that
of the Constitution of Missouri.
Second, the Constitution of Missouri, Article 4, Section 16, provides
for the payment of the members of the General Assembly and limits
their pay to $5.00 a day for the first seventy days of the session, except
a revision session, and to $1.00 per day for the remainder of the session.
This section further provides that the committees of either house, or
joint committees of both houses, appointed to examine state institutions,
other than those at the seat of government, may receive their actual
expenses. This constitutional provision does not authorize the mem-
bers of such committee to receive any pay or expenses after the ad-
journment of the General Assembly, but prohibits such payment.
I am, therefore, of the opinion that the General Assembly cannot, by
concurrent resolution, authorize the appointment of a committee or com-
mission to examine the state penitentiary or to complete the work of
such examination after the adjournment of the General Assembly, nor
provide for the payment of the service of such commission after ad-
journment. But such investigation after adjournment of the Assembly
can only be made by an act passed by both the Senate and House and
approved by the Governor.
Since writing the above opinion, I have learned that Attorney Gen-
eral Jesse W. Barrett, in March, 1924, gave an opinion to Honorable
William R. Painter, then President Pro Tem of the Missouri Senate,
to the effect that the Senate Road Committee was not authorized to
function after the sinc die adjournment of the legislature, and that mem-
bers of that committee could not be compelled to attend a meeting of
such committee.
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